Geopolitics, Trade Blocs, and the Fragmentation of World Commerce

09/09/2024

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Uri Dadush

The following is an excerpt from Uri Dadush’s newest book: “Geopolitics, Trade Blocs, and the Fragmentation of World Commerce”. 

Introduction: A Global Emergency

The post-war trading system, which is at the foundation of our prosperity and orderly international relations, may be ending. Instead, ahead of us may lie an indefinite period of fragmentation of world trade and a more fractious and unstable world order. As trade rules embodied in the World Trade Organization (WTO)—which are imperfect and outdated but still constitute the bedrock on which the world trade edifice stands (Wolff, 2023)—become increasingly eroded, trade will be reconfigured inefficiently along regional and “friendship” lines. The global economy will slow, expectations of higher living standards will remain unmet, the poverty reduction of decades past may be reversed, and climate action will be impeded (Georgieva, 2023).

This book seeks to address the questions—uppermost in the minds of policymakers and analysts around the world—why fragmentation is happening, how it might evolve, and what can be done to prevent, or at least mitigate, the economic and political disruption that it will bring. I do not claim to provide a definitive answer, nor—frankly—would I expect anyone to do so. Indeed, uncertainty about what fragmentation will bring is the essence of the challenge it poses for policymakers and firms. I aim, however, to advance our understanding of fragmentation by considering both the politics and economic thinking that drive it, and the economic and security context within which it is occurring. I try to sketch possible outcomes of the fragmentation process and suggest policies that respond robustly to the uncertainty the erosion of trade rules is generating.

Along with a succession of crises—the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), China–U.S. tensions, the pandemic, the war in Ukraine—the prevailing narrative on globalization and trade changed. In many quarters trade is no longer viewed as a source of efficiency, growth, and peaceful relations but as a source of unfair competition, inequality, and a threat to national security. What did not change, however, is a compelling body of theoretical and empirical evidence dating back 250 years which shows that nations gain from international trade. If anything, the evidence continues to accumulate. Countries could not have fought the pandemic without trade in vaccines and medical equipment, and without foreign supply of everything when whole nations went into lockdown at various times. As the effects of climate change became more visible in prolonged droughts and other disasters, so did the need for trade in food, solar panels, and critical materials for batteries. As the world’s climate continues to deteriorate, nations will have to choose between agricultural trade and mass migration, and to choose between trade in environmental goods and use of fossil fuels.

Why did the narrative on globalization become so negative and why is the resurgence of protectionism threatening? One reason is as old as the annals of commerce yet remains fundamental. Nations gain from trade but, in sectors where they do not have comparative advantage, workers and capital invested lose, creating a coalition to resist trade. A sequence of crises which undermined confidence in globalization and discredited the prevailing policy paradigm bolstered the political resistance to free trade by those who lose from it. The “Washington Consensus” became the Washington dissensus.

The resistance to trade found new life in three developments. The first is the intensifying rivalry between China and the United States, the world’s superpowers, and largest economies. The second—and connected—development is a revolution and inward turn in the trade policy of the United States, the architect of the post-war system, which has its roots in its increasingly fractious social and political divisions, and to the rising inequality and macroeconomic instability of recent decades. The third development is the mounting concern that WTO rules are outdated and increasingly getting in the way of sovereign preferences in many areas. While traditional agendas such as differences in labor standards and in industrial policy (e.g., support to infant and declining industries) remain insufficiently addressed, even more pressing and divisive issues, namely climate change and national security took center stage.

Economic efficiency mandates that the right policy response to the mounting tensions is not to close trade but to address the problems at the core—to find a strategic accommodation with China, to mitigate the losses of some workers from trade with adequate social support, and to coordinate decarbonization policies. For all its shortcomings, there is enough flexibility in WTO trade rules to accommodate national preferences and where there is not, the WTO offers a means to achieve better coordination without unduly restricting trade. But however valid these arguments are, trade policy is a balancing act between conflicting interests and views, and the balance is rapidly and decisively shifting toward allowing countries more “policy space.”

It takes time for the world economy to change direction and this book shows that the fragmentation of world trade has barely started: it is not too late to prevent fragmentation. Protectionism and rule-breaking in many quarters have been offset by trade liberalization in others, especially under the growing number and increased depth of regional and mega-regional trade agreements. Global value chains continue to show remarkable resilience. Many companies that once called for protection have either become defunct or are adapting, reorienting toward world markets, importing cheaper inputs, drawing on foreign technology, investing overseas, and calling on equity and debt capital from abroad. Trade continues to grow, technology advances, enormous gaps in wages and productivity across the world persist, and the gains from globalization are far from spent.

Yet, the signs that the trading system is on the cusp—that an avalanche of protectionist measures has begun to roll and is building—are unmistakable. These signs now go well beyond the trade war between China and the United States and the sanctions on Russia and Iran. They include, for example, over thirty WTO trade disputes that remain in limbo after its Appellate Body became disabled, a vast increase in trade concerns expressed in WTO committees, large trade-distorting subsidies in the United States which has newly embarked on import-substituting industrial policy, and a widespread expectation that decarbonization measures will cause a new wave of trade disputes. Donald Trump is the Republican candidate in the 2024 Presidential election and has promised to escalate the trade war with China and impose an additional 10 percent MFN tariff on U.S. imports, which would amount to the United States tearing up the WTO and is bound to prompt retaliation by partners that account for most U.S. exports.

Avoiding fragmentation or, at least mitigating the damage it will cause, is possible. An essential condition is for China and the United States to reach an accommodation on trade. The tension in China–U.S. relations is no longer mainly about trade if it ever was, and nor is reduced trade the most worrying consequence of their rift. The rivalry between a rising China and the incumbent United States has preoccupied eminent American scholars such as Graham Allison (2017), John Ikenberry (2014), Henry Kissinger (2011, 2012), and Joseph Nye (2023). The perspectives they offer are diverse, but they build on the same assumption: the nuclear-armed giants have the means to destroy the other without realistic prospect of defense, and so they will coexist or not exist, and must be constantly wary of the risk of escalation. Others of the self-denominated realist school see a military conflict between the superpowers over supremacy in Asia as highly likely (Mearsheimer, 2006)….”

 

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